	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

TECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTROOM:
PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY OR
DESTROYING SOLEMNITY?
Emily Ittner*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, former Justice David Souter famously declared, “I can tell you the
day you see a camera come into our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead
body.”1 In the eighteen years since Justice Souter’s statement, technology has
evolved at an unprecedented rate. Cameras are now allowed in nearly all state
courtrooms2 as well as some federal courts.3 Other technologies, such as smartphones, iPads, and even Twitter are following suit.4 However, as the use of
technology in court increases, so do the risks.
A few days after a Cleveland woman witnessed a fatal shooting, the gunman’s friends found her and threatened her not to testify against him.5 The
friends called her a “snitch,” said that there was a price on her head, and posted
comments about her on Facebook.6 Fearing for her life, the woman reported the
man to the police, who arrested and charged him with witness intimidation and
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retaliation.7 He pled guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison.8 This
example and those that follow illustrate one of the most significant issues with
new technology: the growing problem of witness intimidation, which has
evolved from physical and verbal threats to include more sophisticated, indirect forms of digital harassment.9
In a recent U.S. District Court case, a white supremacist was sentenced to 42
months in prison for stalking and threatening a federal juror.10 In a 2008 tirade
on his website,11 the defendant labeled the juror a “gay Jewish anti-racist” and
made references to the juror’s long-term partner.12 The defendant also posted
detailed information about the juror on the website, including the juror’s color
photo, address, phone number, and even the name of his cat.13 And in yet another case, an anonymous social media user named “rats215” posted photographs, police statements, and testimony of more than thirty witnesses to violent crimes across Philadelphia since February 2013.14 The frequently updated
“rats215” account drew nearly 7,900 eager followers, who publicly “liked” and
responded to the postings.15 “Post some new rats,” a commenter wrote in September. “I needa put a hit out on them.”16
These cases all demonstrate the same growing problem: digital witness
intimidation is on the rise both inside and outside of the courtroom. As the
issue continues to evolve, prosecutors and courts must address it. While
witness intimidation is not a new phenomenon, certain methods are relatively
new. In the past, threats
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10 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Press Release, White Supremacist William White Sentenced
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11 William A. White, the white supremacist, posted the following on his website: “Gay
Jewish anti-racist [Hale Juror A] was a juror who played a key role in convicting Matt Hale.
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[name]. [His/Her] phone number is [phone number], cell phone [phone number], and
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08-CR-851 (Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Criminal Complaint], available at
http://commcns.org/1pIdWuc.
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J. (Feb. 25, 2013), http://commcns.org/1nRFJZE.
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14 Jam Kotenko, Instagram Account Intimidating Witness Shut Down, Instigates Cellphone Ban in Courts, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://commcns.org/1rwkOPN.
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were waged either face-to-face, over the phone, or through letters.17 Now,
through modern technology, there are a myriad of new ways to harass individuals on the Internet through posts, status updates, and tweets. Witnesses
who are victims or eyewitnesses of violent crimes, law enforcement officers, or
codefendants who cooperate with the prosecution are particularly at risk. Digital witness intimidation differs from face-to-face threats because a photo, recording, or online post can be instantly sent, viewed by a mass audience, and
then readily destroyed. This creates problems for judges and attorneys alike, as
evidence can be difficult to obtain and tie to a particular suspect.
This Comment advocates for a uniform set of rules that expressly 1) clarifies
the types of devices that will be permitted in courtrooms, 2) specifies the
acceptable uses of such devices, 3) defines terms such as “broadcast” and
“reporter” to avoid ambiguity, and 4) creates procedures for rule enforcement,
broadcasting requests, pool arrangements, and other logistical concerns. Part
II provides a historical overview of the media and public’s right of access and
use of technology in court. It summarizes the conflicting case law and traditional arguments on both sides of the debate about whether such technology
should be permitted. This analysis includes the inherent difficulties faced by
judges in their determination of whether to allow technology in their courtrooms. Judges must weigh a variety of competing factors, including the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and public trial,18 the press and public’s
First Amendment right to observe trials,19 and the right of all parties to “dignity, order, and decorum” in “all court proceedings.”20 Part III investigates state
experimentation with cameras in court, and discusses current federal and state
policies regarding cameras in court. Part IV explores recent case law in order
to examine the major problems being posed by the use of smartphones, laptops, and social media. Part V uses three federal cases to illustrate the ambiguity of current electronic media policies, and to advocate for a uniform set of
rules. Part VI evaluates Utah and Kansas’ recently amended electronic media
laws and offers suggestions for improvement. Finally, this Comment concludes
with an advisory to legislatures seeking to revise their electronic media rules.
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U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
19 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 & n.17 (1980) (recognizing a presumptive right to attend criminal trials).
20 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (“It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of
proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.”).
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II. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT TECHNOLOGY USE IN COURT BY
THE PUBLIC AND MEDIA

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

The history of technology in the courtroom by the public and media is storied and complex. Debates over whether technology should be allowed in court
have persisted for years, resulting in confusing and contradictory case law. The
rise of modern media, the dramatic increase of social media usage, and the proliferation of small, handheld devices, have created new and unexpected problems both in and out of the courtroom.21 To ameliorate confusion, it is necessary to examine how the former judicial rules of access and technology use in
court (which were largely written to address the media’s use of television cameras and other recording devices22 ) apply to the technologies of today.
A. First Amendment Right of Access in Courtrooms
1. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980): The Court Asserts the
Right of the Public to Attend Criminal Trials
Members of the press and public enjoy expansive freedom to observe and
report on judicial proceedings.23 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court held that the public had implicit First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to attend criminal trials.24 The Court explained that unless a trial
court found an overriding interest and included it on the record, criminal trials
were open to the public.25 In addition, the Court said that a trial judge should
explore alternative solutions that preserve fairness before excluding the media
and public from the courtroom.26
The Majority based its conclusion on four key factors. First, the Court
looked to the long history of public criminal trials in the Anglo-American jus-
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Cathy Packer, Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones
and Computers in Court? An Examination of the Arguments, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573,
583–84 (2013). For example, as Packer observes, some judges have taken the view that
smartphones are the functional equivalents of televisions and prohibit smartphones by using
the same arguments that justify the ban on television cameras. Id. at 584.
22 Id. at 574.
23 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1980). It is important
to note that, as Justice Brennan observed, there is a distinction between the public and the
media’s right of access; regardless, “the media’s right of access is at least equal to that of the
general public.” Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 580.
25 Id. at 581.
26 Id. at 580–81. Alternate solutions to excluding the media include changes of venue,
jury sequestration, and in camera hearings. Id. at 600 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
tice system, spanning from open trials in England since before the Norman
Conquest and in the United States, since colonial times.27 Throughout this vast
time span and “although great changes in courts and procedure took place,”
there was “one thing [that] remained constant,” the Richmond Court observed,
and that was “the public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was
decided.”28
Second, citing Matthew Hale and William Blackstone, Chief Justice Burger
(writing for the majority in Richmond Newspapers) stated that open trials help
ensure fair proceedings for all parties involved.29 More specifically, Chief Justice Burger noted that access to criminal trials reduces perjury, misconduct,
and biased decisions.30 Burger also explained that public access serves as an
important check on the other branches of government, assures the public that
procedural rights are respected, and upholds public confidence in the judicial
process.31
Third, the Majority recognized the significant therapeutic value of public
trials.32 In the wake of shocking crime, the court provides an important outlet
for a community’s outrage, frustration, and need for retribution.33 Chief Justice
Burger summarized by stating, “To work effectively, it is important that society’s criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice . . . and the appearance
of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it.”34 In other
words, the public naturally wants to see justice being served, and they will not
be satisfied unless they observe both the judicial process and its results.35 To
aid in the “community catharsis” after a disturbing crime and to maintain public confidence, the Court believed that it was imperative that trials be transparent and open to the public.36
Finally, the Court recognized the educational value of allowing a criminal
trial to be conducted in the open.37 Public trials allow citizens to learn not only
about the facts of a particular case, but also about the legal system in general.38
This increased understanding helps to build public confidence that justice is
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being served.39 The Court reasoned that members of the media function as surrogates for the public, because most people acquire information primarily
through print and electronic media.40 Further, the Court acknowledged that the
media has the same right of access as the public, contributes to public understanding of the law, and adds to the overall integrity of criminal proceedings.41 Although technology has rapidly evolved since Richmond v. Newspapers, the arguments used by the Majority remain central to the debate over
technology today.
2. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California II (1986): The Court
Coins the “Experience and Logic” Test
Six years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court expanded the right of access and developed the “Experience and Logic Test,” used to determine
whether a judicial proceeding should be open to the public.42 In PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Supreme Court held that
the right of access to criminal proceedings extends to preliminary hearings.43
The case involved a nurse charged with murdering twelve patients by injecting
them with lethal doses of the heart drug lidocaine.44 The judge granted the defendant’s motion to bar the public from the preliminary hearing under a California statute that required proceedings to be open unless “exclusion of the
public is necessary in order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.”45 Subsequently, California and Press-Enterprise Co. sought to have
the preliminary hearing transcript released.46 The California Supreme Court
held that there was no general First Amendment right of access to preliminary
hearings and denied the request to release the transcript; and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the issue.47
To answer the question, the Court articulated the two-part “Experience
and Logic Test,” which is still used by courts today to determine whether
the judicial proceedings must be open.48 The experience prong of the test
focuses on “whether the place and process have historically been open to the
press and
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42 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 9
(1986).
43 Id. at 13.
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45 Id. at 3–4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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general public.”49 The logic prong examines “whether public access plays a
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”50 The Court reasoned that if a particular proceeding passes both the experience and logic prongs, a First Amendment right of access attaches.51 However, the Court also qualified the test by asserting that a right of access is not
absolute, and under limited circumstances, particularly if a defendant’s right to
a fair trial is compromised, closure may be warranted.52
Under Press Enterprise II, to close the trial to the public and media, the
judge must find: first, there is a “substantial probability” that publicity will
prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial; and, second, there is no reasonable alternative to closure.53 Closure, in other words, must be an option of last
resort, which is essential and narrowly tailored.54

	
  

	
  
	
  

B. Cameras in the Courtroom
1. Estes v. State of Texas: The Court Addresses the Impact of Cameras in
Court
During the 1930s, the Supreme Court reversed convictions of several highprofile defendants after finding that cameras had “physically and psychologically” disrupted the proceedings.55 In the Supreme Court’s first major case on
television cameras in the courtroom, Estes v. Texas, the sharply divided Court
relied on similar arguments to reverse a man’s swindling conviction.56 The
courtroom found that the circus-like atmosphere created by the media impinged on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.57 The room was filled to capacity
with newspaper reporters, cameramen, and spectators, with thirty or more people crowding the aisles.58
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53 Id. at 14.
54 Id. at 13–14.
55 Packer, supra note 21, at 578.
56 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534–36 (1965). In Estes, four Justices concluded that
the presence of television cameras made it impossible to have a fair trial and, therefore,
were per se prejudicial. See Constitutional Law: Sixth Amendment, Televising Trials, 15
AKRON L. REV. 183, 185 (1982). Four Justices rejected the per se rule. Id. Justice Harlan
was the deciding vote; he concluded that the defendant’s due process rights were violated,
but he disagreed that television cameras were per se prejudicial. Id.
57 Estes, 381 U.S. at 536.
58 Id. at 552–53 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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An article in the New York Times described the pandemonium as follows:
A television motor van, big as an intercontinental bus, was parked outside
the courthouse and the second-floor courtroom was a forest of equipment. Two
television cameras had been set up inside the bar and four more marked cameras were aligned just outside the gates.
A microphone stuck its 12-inch snout inside the jury box, now occupied by
an overflow of reporters from the press table, and three microphones confronted [the trial judge] on his bench. Tables and wires snaked over the floor.59
The Estes Court said that the use of television in court does not contribute to
the judicial objective of ascertaining truth and claimed that its use injected an
“irrelevant factor into court proceedings.”60 The Estes Court went on to illustrate four primary concerns over the use of cameras in court. First, the Court
said that the intense publicity surrounding a trial could pressure the jury to render a verdict that comports with the popular opinion or unduly distracts jurors
during trial.61 Second, the Court was concerned that televised proceedings
would affect the quality and accuracy of testimony.62 The witness’s knowledge
that he or she is in front of a national audience may cause them to be frightened, arrogant, or melodramatic.63 Furthermore, the fear of appearing on
camera could make certain witnesses reluctant to testify.64 Third, trial judges
would be burdened by having to ensure both the fairness of the proceedings
and manage the presence of cameras and reporters.65 In Estes, for example, the
cameras’ presence forced the trial judge to conduct hearings and to enter orders
that were otherwise unnecessary.66 If one trial were televised, the Estes Court
reasoned, then the media would put great pressure on other elected judges to
also televise their proceedings.67
Finally, the Court worried about the effect of television on defendants.68
Televising a defendant resembled a “police line-up in the third degree” and had
the potential to violate the defendant’s values, dignity, and focus on the trial.69
Continuing, the Estes Court said, “A defendant on trial for a specific crime is
	
  

	
  
59 Homer Bigart, Estes Goes on Trial in Texas with TV in Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1962, at 1, 46. Chief Justice Warren cited this passage in his concurrence with the Estes
majority. Estes, 381 U.S. at 553 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
60 Estes, 381 U.S. at 544.
61 Id. at 545–46.
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entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The
heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will
inevitably result in prejudice.”70 Cognizant of the pace of technological development and the possibility that broadcasting might become less disruptive in
trials, the Estes Court tailored its holding narrowly to apply to the effect of
television on trials as the technology existed at that time.71 Although technology has become less invasive since Estes, courts remain divided over its impact on trial participants.
2. Chandler v. Florida: States Begin to Experiment with Cameras in Court
In 1981, the Supreme Court departed from the Estes rule through its holding
in Chandler v. Florida. The Chandler Court held that allowing cameras in the
courtroom was not an automatic violation of a criminal defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.72 In Chandler, the appellants, Miami Beach
policemen at the time of arrest, were charged with conspiracy to commit burglary and grand larceny.73 The State’s principal witness was a novice radio operator, who had inadvertently recorded conversations between the appellants
over their police radios during the burglary.74 The case was a media sensation.75
The appellants were convicted by a jury and objected to the televising of the
trial, claiming that it was neither fair nor impartial.76 The Supreme Court noted
that the appellants-defendants had failed to show that the broadcast coverage
had actually prejudiced the trial.77 The Chandler Court reasoned that, under
Estes, there was no absolute prohibition against televising the proceedings,
thus, Florida was not prohibited from “experimenting” with cameras in the
courtroom.78 Citing federalism concerns, the Chandler Court left open the door
for state courts to experiment with allowing cameras in their courtrooms.79
III. CURRENT
COURT

POLICIES

REGARDING

CAMERAS

IN

A. State Policies
70
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Id. at 551–52.
72 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981).
73 Id. at 567. The crimes arose from the officers’ breaking and entering into a popular
Miami Beach restaurant. Id.
74 Id.
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76 Id. at 568.
77 Id. at 579.
78 Id. at 573–74.
79 Id. at 577, 580.
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From the 1970s through the 1990s, many state courts experimented with
changing their court rules to expand electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings.80 The vast majority of these rules have now been made permanent.81
With the exception of the District of Columbia, all states allow some camera
coverage of their trial or appellate courts.82 State rules permitting digital broadcasting differ significantly in their approach and methodology.83 Limits on
coverage can be categorized, generally, by the type of court, proceeding, and
consent (or lack thereof) by the parties.84
Some states have created a presumption that electronic media coverage is allowed in proceedings that are accessible to the public.85 Limiting coverage requires a consideration of factors such as the right to a fair trial, privacy concerns, and safety interests.86 Other states “expressly prohibit electronic media
coverage of certain proceedings, witnesses, or trial participants, such as juveniles, sexual-assault victims, and jurors.”87 In lieu of explicit prohibitions, other
states give the judge broad discretion to limit coverage to protect the fairness
and safety of the proceedings.88
The Radio Television Digital News Association (“RTDNA”)89 maintains a
state-by-state guidebook of camera coverage allowed in state courts.90 According to the RTDNA, electronic media restrictions generally fall into three “tiers”
of restrictiveness.91 Tier 1 states, of which there are nineteen, allow the most
electronic media coverage in state courtrooms.92 Tier 2 states have rules that
prohibit coverage of certain types of cases or proceedings, or that prohibit
coverage of most or all categories of witnesses who object to coverage.93
Finally,
80

TECHNOLOGY BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 6.
Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 6–7.
85 Id. at 7.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 About
RTDNA and RTDNF, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N,
http://commcns.org/1kvuyQy (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (“Founded as a grassroots organization . . . RTDNA works to protect the rights of electronic journalists in the courts and
legislatures throughout the country . . . .”).
90 See Cameras in the Court: A State-by-State Guide, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS
ASS’N, http://commcns.org/1gRJNsk (last visited May 31, 2014).
91 TECHNOLOGY BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 7–8.
92 Id. at 7. Those nineteen states are: California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
93 Id. at 7–8. The sixteen Tier 2 States are: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indi81

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
fifteen Tier 3 states only permit appellate coverage or have such restrictive
coverage rules that coverage is virtually banned.94

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

B. Federal Policies
Federal courts have been more reluctant to change due to the language of
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibiting photography
and broadcasting in the courtroom.95 Currently, cameras are allowed only in the
Second and Ninth Circuits, which amended their rules and guidelines to allow
for electronic media coverage.96 In addition, there have been federal pilot programs to evaluate the effects of electronic media coverage on the judicial process.97 The pilot programs have been limited to civil proceedings.98
C. Lack of Uniformity among Rules, States, & Judges
Federal and state courts lack uniformity as to how to apply current electronic
media rules to changing technology. The rules governing the use of smartphones, tablets, and other small computers vary greatly by state and judge.99
The Supreme Court’s role in shaping First Amendment right of access doctrine
has been “forceful, yet short-lived.”100 Since the Press-Enterprise II decision in
1986, the Court has left the right of access issues to the lower courts to resolve.101 Many lower courts have considerably expanded the right of access to
nearly all aspects of both civil and criminal proceedings, including the accompanying court documents.102 However, the increasing incongruity of laws of
access continues today.103 At the present time, there are many sources of access

	
  

	
  
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia. Id.
94 Id. at 8. As of the time of Utah’s report, the Tier 3 states, which had the most stringent camera broadcasting policies, were: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, and Utah. Id.
95 Id. at 10; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 (“Except as otherwise provided by a statute or
these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during
judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings form the courtroom.”).
96 TECHNOLOGY BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 10.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Packer, supra note 21, at 583.
100 Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 263 (1995).
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laws, none of which are “internally settled or externally consistent with one
another.”104 Such sources include the Supreme Court’s “Experience and Logic”
test, Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, common law, local
statutes, and state courtroom rules governing electronic media.105 Judges confronted with an alleged right of access must enter a “legal minefield” 106 of
clashing yet interconnected laws.107
Today, there is little evidence to show how judges decide whether to allow
digital technology in their courtrooms.108 Because so few judicial rulings about
technology access result in written opinions, the majority of evidence must be
gathered from news reports.109 Anecdotal evidence suggests that judges use
many of the traditional arguments cited both in support and opposition to permitting television in court to support their arguments.110 The arguments used by
judges to prohibit new technology in the courtroom reason that new forms of
technology (such as smartphones, tablets, and laptops) are functionally equivalent to television cameras, and thus carry the same risks.111 Specifically, judges
worry that like cameras, new technology may: disrupt judicial order and decorum;112 impede proper fact finding; distract jurors, witnesses, and others;113 create a spectacle out of cases with grotesque facts or a high-profile defendant,
because the media will appeal to the lowest common denominator if profit	
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Id.
Id. at 269–70. The “Experience and Logic” test refers to the Supreme Court’s twoprong test of tradition of openness (history) and instrumental utility of access (functionality)
for the construction of a right of access. Id. at 269.
106 Id. at 263 (quoting Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Blain, 808 F.2d 395, 399 (5th
Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107
Id.
108 Packer, supra note 21, at 584.
109 Id. For example, in Cook County, Illinois, where gang violence is endemic, a judge
banned cell phones from the courtroom, because people were using the cell phones to take
pictures of witnesses and jurors during trial for the purpose of intimidation. John Kass,
Judge Did Right Thing by Banning Cellphones in Courtrooms, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://commcns.org/1u3kGoV.
110 Packer, supra note 21, at 584. Packer observes that some judges who allow smartphones, justify the decision by describing them as less “physically and psychologically intrusive than television.” Id. Alternatively, judges who prohibit smartphones and electronic
devices rely on the same arguments made against permitting televisions in the courtroom—
they are a disruption, an impediment to fact finding, and a security risk. Id.
111
Id.
112 See, e.g., High Court Justice Weighs in on Tweeting Ban at Hudson Murder Trial,
CBS CHI. (Apr. 30, 2012, 5:33 AM), http://commcns.org/RRE0XO (“Tweeting takes away
from the dignity of a courtroom. The judge doesn’t want the trial to turn into a circus.”).
113 Packer, supra note 21, at 579. Not only do digital devices distract the juror, but the
devices might also lead to a mistrial when that juror uses them to research aspects of the
case at hand. See Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS
(Dec. 8, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://commcns.org/1kXNJY1.
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able;114 and jeopardize the security of trial participants, including jurors, witnesses, court staff, and law enforcement officers.115 In contrast, judges’ arguments in support of new technology in courts center around how social media,
smartphones, laptops, and tablets are less disruptive than television cameras
while providing all of the benefits of an open trial (public education, confidence in the justice system, and outlet for community rage).116 Since the Estes
decision, judges still remain split over whether new means of digital communication have evolved to the point where their presence in courtrooms is no
longer physically and psychologically disruptive.117

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

IV. NEW
TECHNOLOGY
THREATS

&

NEW

The new prevalence of electronic portable devices presents a variety of challenges for judges and attorneys alike, such as maintaining order and decorum
in the courtroom, conducting fair hearings for the defendant, and protecting all
parties from harm and harassment, making it all the more important to set uniform rules.
A. Recent Cases
1. Juror Secrecy & Impartiality
One of the main problems with social media in particular is its impact on juror impartiality and secrecy, which can destroy the fairness of proceedings. In

	
  
	
  
114 See, e.g., Christo Lassiter, Put the Lens Cap Back on Cameras in the Courtroom: A
Fair Trial is at Stake, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6, 8, 10 (1995).
115 Packer, supra note 21, at 584; see also Karen Franklin, ‘Digital Lynch Mob’ Assaults
Expert Witness in Murder Trial: Is Internet Vigilanteism in Jodi Arias Case a Sign of Things
to Come?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Apr. 18, 2013), http://commcns.org/1m2imbB (commenting on the cyber-bulling and online harassment of a defense expert in the Jodi Arias trial).
116 Packer, supra note 21, at 584. The loud, noisy cameras in the Estes era do not exist
anymore, cameras are inconspicuous (an acute concern in Estes was the disruptive physical
presence of cameras) exists no longer. See Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising the Judicial Branch: In Furtherance of the Public’s First Amendment Rights, 69 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1519, 1542–43 (1996). Further, there is a good argument to be made that using
Twitter is more akin to note taking than televising. See Adriana C. Cervantes, Will Twitter
Be Following You in the Courtroom?: Why Reporters Should Be Allowed to Broadcast During Courtroom Proceedings, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 149 (2010). In Wisconsin, a special committee recommended cameras in the courtroom due to their educational
value. See Stacy Blasiola, Say “Cheese!” Cameras and Bloggers in Wisconsin’s Courtrooms, 1 REYNOLDS CT. & MEDIA L.J. 197, 199, 200 (2011) (“[T]he committee’s recommendation was to allow television cameras sparingly and for educational purposes . . . .”).
117 Packer, supra note 21, at 578, 584.
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U.S. v. Fumo, the Defendant, Pennsylvania State Senator Vincent Fumo,
moved for a new trial when a juror posted messages about the trial on Facebook and Twitter.118 After Fumo’s motion, the trial court held a hearing to
question the juror about his Internet activities, social-networking visits, and
general media usage throughout the trial.119 On review, the appellate court
agreed with the trial court’s characterization of the posts as “nothing more than
harmless ramblings having no prejudicial effect” that were “so vague as to be
virtually meaningless.”120 Furthermore, the appellate court pointed to the fact
that there was no evidence that the juror had been contacted regarding the posts
or that he had used media sources aside from Facebook and Twitter in that single posting incident.121 The Third Circuit concluded that although the juror had
violated the rule against discussing the trial outside of court, he was nevertheless competent and aware of his duties, and there was no evidence that his misconduct had a prejudicial impact on the Defendant.122 Social media’s effects are
subtle and difficult to measure, which has made it increasingly difficult for
defendants to prove juror prejudice.

	
  

	
  

2. Jury & Witness Distraction
Certain judges worry that smartphones and small computers disrupt the proceedings, thus distracting jurors and witnesses.123 In the 2012 trial of a man
accused of murdering the family of singer-actress Jennifer Hudson, an Illinois
judge banned the use of cell phones after cell phone rings had, on three occasions, interrupted testimony.124 Prior to the interruption, the judge had permitted the use of cell phones among journalists.125 However, she restricted cell
phone use to e-mail, ironically stating that reporters posting to social media
would be distracting.126 In contrast, during the 2012 trial of Dr. Conrad Murray
for the involuntary manslaughter of Michael Jackson, a judge permitted tweeting, and one local news station sent out nearly 1,900 tweets to 3,000 eager fol-
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United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2011).
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124 Michael Tarm, Jennifer Hudson Family Murder Trial: Judge Bans Cellphones from
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lowers.127
3. Threatening Security
Perhaps the most compelling argument for banning new digital devices is
the possible threat to the security of all parties. In U.S. v. Moussaoui, the judge,
presiding over the criminal trial of an Al-Qaeda member accused of executing
the September 11th attacks, refused to allow cameras in the courtroom.128 The
judge disagreed with Court TV, the intervenor, that “allowing the public to
participate through the lens of the television camera will serve as a check on
the judicial process.”129 The judge distinguished attending a trial (which leaves
spectators with memories of the witness) from television broadcasting (which
records and distributes the faces of the witnesses).130 The recordation and
transmittal of the faces of witnesses and of law enforcement officers would
present a serious threat to their individual safety.131
The Court also pointed to the effect on juror safety and raised concerns
about the temptation of jurors to render a “popular verdict.”132 Finally, the
judge rejected the idea to mask the faces of witnesses and jurors for several
key reasons. First, he said it created an additional complication in what was
already a complex case.133 Second, in the case of a mistake, a witness’s identity
could be exposed to Al-Qaeda, a worldwide terrorist network.134 Third, the
faces of attorneys, security officers, and court staff would be revealed, as
would the physical layout of the courtroom, which could lead to a variety of
long-term security issues.135 Furthermore, a retrial of such a highly publicized
trial would be extremely difficult.136 And lastly, the worldwide broadcasting of
the trial would be an “open invitation to any trial participant to engage in
showmanship or make a public spectacle for the world to see or hear.”137 When
he denied the media access to the proceedings, the judge in Moussaoui
overcame arguments that the public’s interest in the trial was significant,
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128 United States v. Moussaoui, 205 F.R.D. 183, 184 (E.D. Va. 2002).
129 Id. at 186.
130 Id. at 186–87.
131 Id. at 187.
132 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.

	
  

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

that they needed retribution, and that it would be educated by the proceedings.138
V. DIFFERING JUDGES’ INTERPRETATIONS OVER HOW TO APPLY
FEDERAL RULE 53 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO “TWITTER”
The Supreme Court has yet to address directly what technology the public
and the media may bring with them to court.139 The Court has stated that the
First Amendment right of access by the press is not superior to that of the public.140 Therefore, while the First Amendment guarantees that journalists may
attend, listen, and report on judicial proceedings, this right does not extend to
the right to televise, record, and broadcast trials.141 In addition, while the Sixth
Amendment requires that a trial be public, this right is fulfilled by opening the
doors to the public and press; it does not require that the trial “be broadcast live
or on tape to the public.”142 Without the Supreme Court’s guidance, some federal courts have used Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
ban cameras, recording devices, and social media.143 In contrast, other federal
courts have embraced modern technology with open arms.
One social media platform, Twitter, has been front and center in at least two
federal district courtrooms over the past few years.144 Twitter is a free microblogging network that allows users to instantly share small bits of information
called “tweets.”145 Tweets contain videos, photos, or text of 140 characters or
less and are shared via mobile message, instant message, or over the Internet in
real time.146 Twitter accounts can be linked to websites, blogs, social networking sites, and other electronic platforms with wide audiences.147 The two judges
in these cases both faced the same question: “Should members of the press be
allowed to report on federal criminal trials directly from the courtroom via
Twitter?”148 However, after applying two different rules of Federal Criminal
Procedure, the judges came to contradictory conclusions.149
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140 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
141 United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983).
142 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 610.
143 Packer, supra note 21, at 577, 585.
144 Jacob E. Dean, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Twitter, “Broadcasting,” and Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 53, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 769, 770 (2010).
145 See generally TWITTER, http://commcns.org/1jIScce (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
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A. U.S. v. Shelnutt and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53
In U.S. v. Shelnutt, the judge defined “broadcast” literally to deny a newspaper reporter’s request to use a “handheld electronic device (e.g., a BlackBerry
or cellular telephone)” to tweet during a criminal trial.150 The Shelnutt defendant objected to the request.151 The Shelnutt judge determined that tweeting
during a trial was a form of “broadcasting,” and thus prohibited under Rule 53
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.152 According to Rule 53, “[T]he
court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom.”153 The Shelnutt judge considered it significant that Rule 53 had been
amended in 2002 by removing the word “radio” from “radio broadcasting,” as
that Rule 53 applied to “broadcasting.”154 Citing the Advisory Committee’s
notes to Rule 53, Judge Land noted that the 2002 change was a purposeful expansion meant to sweep additional types of broadcasting under Rule 53.155
Judge Land relied on the expansive definition of “broadcasting” given in
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary,156 although “broadcasting” could be interpreted
narrowly to apply only to the dissemination of information through television
or radio.157 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “broadcasting” as “the casting or scattering in all directions” and “the act of making widely known.”158
According to Judge Land, Twitter clearly fell within the expansive definition.159 Judge Land was also concerned about the instantaneous nature of Twitter, where electronic messages about the trial proceedings are immediately
communicated to a broad audience.160 Finally, Judge Land pointed out that although Rule 53 restricts broadcast coverage of federal criminal proceedings,
the press and public still had a First Amendment right of access to attend, listen, and report on criminal trials.161 Citing U.S. v. Hastings, Judge Land made
the important distinction between the First Amendment right to attend and ob-
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serve, as opposed to the right to broadcast or publish from trial.162 Therefore,
the requestor did not have a First Amendment right to tweet during the criminal proceedings.163
Although Judge Land ultimately denied the request to tweet from the courtroom, the Court did offer a “media room” to members of the press.164 The media room was located near the courtroom door and served as a place for journalists to report on trial proceedings near but outside the courtroom.165
The Shelnutt case is instructional, because it demonstrates that the rules
governing electronic media are vague and fail to provide adequate guidance to
the courts. It will be extremely important to use precise terms in lieu of those
such as “broadcasting,” which has multiple definitions and is subject to various
interpretations. Another challenge raised by smartphones and social media applications is that they can be used in many different ways. A smartphone, for
instance, can be used to make phone calls, send text messages, post to social
media sites, record videos, take photographs, and correspond by e-mail. Similarly, Twitter allows a user to send “tweets” through various media such as
videos, photos, or text.166 Therefore, a judge deciding whether to restrict Twitter coverage must decide whether Twitter should be entirely prohibited, or only
certain types of “tweets.” To categorically prohibit tweets, the judge would
need to distinguish which types are “functionally equivalent” to broadcasting
and therefore subject to restriction.

	
  

	
  

B. U.S. v. Campbell & Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b)
In contrast, District Court of Kansas Judge Thomas Marten permitted a
Wichita Eagle reporter to tweet live from court during the trial of six Crips
gang members charged with racketeering.167 Judge Marten relied on Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b), which governs the procedure to be used in
District Court in the absence of a controlling law and grants a judge broad discretion over his courtroom.168 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b) states,
in part, that “[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with
federal law, these rules, and the local rules of the district.”169 Online streaming
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is still a very unusual practice in federal court, particularly in criminal cases.170
However, federal judges retain wide discretion in determining whether to permit emerging online technology in their courtroom and to dictate how such
technology may be used.171 Proponents of Twitter say it is equivalent to more
traditional means of reporting, and that it helps to improve transparency and
public access to courts.172 Echoing these arguments, Judge Marten stated, “The
more we can do to open the process to the public, the greater the public understanding - the more legitimacy the public system will have in the eyes of the
public . . . .”173
The counter argument is that the danger of social media, particularly in the
context of this case, greatly outweighed any benefit to the public. The case
involved multiple co-defendant gang members who faced a variety of assault,
murder, and drug charges. Twitter coverage allowed instant dissemination of
the proceedings to a wide audience and arguably posed a grave safety risk to
witnesses, who faced possible gang retaliation. It is worth noting that many of
the reporter’s tweets focused specifically on witnesses.174 For example,
Sylvester tweeted, “Judge Marten is talking to [sic] reluctant witness in chambers with a court reporter transcribing the conversation,” and that “[t]he witness who was yelling in the hallway earlier has not returned to the courthouse.”175
Among those who followed Sylvester’s Twitter posts was the father of one
of the defendants, who lived out of state and was unable to attend the trial.176
On one hand, providing real-time access to a member of the defendant’s
family is a strong justification for allowing Twitter in court. A criminal trial is
a high stakes endeavor whose outcome may separate family members for an
indefinite period of time. Live broadcasting is one way that relatives,
friends, and other members of the public can be assured that the trial is conducted fairly. On the other hand, there is always a potential risk that interested
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parties (such as gang members) will use readily accessible trial information to
deliberately cause harm and interfere with the judicial process.

	
  

	
  

C. The Jerry Sandusky Case
The high-profile Jerry Sandusky criminal trial177 represents yet another example illustrating a judge’s confusion over whether or not “tweeting” constitutes broadcasting. In the Sandusky trial, Judge John M. Cleland issued a Decorum Order that allowed credentialed members of the media to text or tweet
from the courtroom using cell phones, laptops, or other electronic devices, with
the stipulation that press members could not take or transmit photographs, or
record or broadcast a verbatim account of the proceedings.178 Members of the
public, however, were not permitted to possess cell phones, laptops, smartphones, or any other comparable electronic device.179
According to Judge Cleland, this Decorum Order was allowed under Pennsylvania Criminal Procedure Rule 112180 and Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
3, because texting and tweeting are distinct from “broadcasting.”181 Judge Cleland rejected a plain language definition of broadcasting and instead used a
contextual interpretation of Rule 112 and Canon 3.182 Judge Cleland believed
that broadcasting was “the simultaneous transmission of a verbatim account of
the proceeding” and, therefore, tweeting or texting was permissible so long as
the communication did not include a verbatim account.183
In June 2012, Judge Cleland rescinded the portion of the Decorum Order
that allowed for texting and tweeting.184 Judge Cleland reasoned that his order
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Feb. 19, 2014).
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180 PA. R. CRIM. P. 112(A) states that the court shall prohibit “the taking of photographs,
video, or motion pictures of any judicial proceedings” and the “transmission of communications by telephone, radio, television, or advanced communication technology . . . from the
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181 PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 3.A.(7); Memorandum and Order at 6–7,
Pennsylvania v. Sandusky, Nos. CP-14-CR2421-2011, CP 14-CR2422-2011 (Pa. Centre
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in May was confusing to reporters, and he cited a report stating that tweeting
and blogging from the courtroom were prohibited by Rule 112.185 Therefore,
for the high-profile Sandusky criminal trial, reporters were allowed to possess
and use electronic devices as “tools of the trade,” but were not allowed to use
electronic devices to transmit any type of communication from the courtroom.186

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

VI. ANALYSIS OF UTAH AND KANSAS’ ELECTRONIC MEDIA RULE
AMENDMENTS
A. Rationale for 2012 Electronic Media Courtroom Rule Amendments
1. Kansas
The preface to Kansas’ new rules articulates the attempt by the drafters to
balance the integrity of the judicial process with the free flow of information.187
On one hand, the electronic devices present a unique test to the court’s concerns over the dignity, security, and distraction of participants during a trial.188
On the other hand, electronic communication devices are “redefining the news
media, the informational product disseminated, and the timeliness of the content.”189 The new media policies must recognize that such devices have become
an essential tool for court observers, participants, and members of the media.190
Therefore, policies should be flexible enough to utilize the increased access
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court and participants for immediate access to information.
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and transparency made possible through electronic devices.191
2. Utah
The intent of Utah’s rules, to establish uniformity for electronic media coverage and to permit electronic coverage while balancing concerns over fair trial
rights, personal privacy, safety, security, and other legitimate interests, are very
similar to those of Kansas.192 The impact of Utah’s amended rules was extremely significant, in that the state’s media rules, once among the most restrictive, became some of the most liberal in the nation.193
B. Utah’s Judicial Council Committee & Pilot Program
In order to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of expanding media
coverage in trial courtrooms, Utah established a Judicial Council Committee
composed of judges, attorneys, and court staff.194 The Committee studied the
impact of technology in courtrooms and oversaw a camera pilot program in
Davis County, Utah.195 Based on their evaluation of the Davis County Pilot
Program, as well as the empirical research and experience of other state studies, the Committee concluded, “The results from the state studies were unanimous: electronic media coverage of courtroom proceedings—whether civil or
criminal—has no detrimental impact on parties, jurors, counsel, or courtroom
decorum. . . . [T]he state studies revealed that fears about witness distraction,
nervousness, distortion, fear of harm, and reluctance to testify were unfounded.”196 The Committee also said that similar federal pilot programs had
yielded similarly positive results as well.197 Finally, the Committee found that
electronic media coverage of proceedings serves a significant educational and
informational benefit to the public.198
C. Flaws of the State and Federal Pilot Programs
There are a variety of problems with using the results of state and federal pilot programs to justify an expansion in coverage to all types of technologies.
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Perhaps the strongest argument against these studies is that they only evaluate
the effects of television recording and broadcasting on a trial.199 Laptops,
smartphones, and tablets are fundamentally different than television cameras.
Unlike television cameras, newer devices are discrete, easy to conceal, and
multi-functional. The newer devices can instantly disseminate information
through a variety of platforms. Therefore, the positive benefits derived from
television recording should not be used to justify a blanket allowance of all
other technologies. Courts are generally reluctant to apply old legislation to
new technologies.200 If courts wish to measure the impact of Twitter, laptops,
and other portable electronic devices, the courts should design separate pilot
programs for each type of technology.
Furthermore, the methodology of most of the pilot programs contains
many fundamental flaws. First, the short length of such programs (which generally range from one to three years) and diversity of cases makes it difficult to
obtain a representative sample, collect accurate data, and generalize accurately
about the results. Furthermore, the evaluation design of many programs is defective. For example, the 1994 Federal Camera Pilot Program measured the
perceived (rather than actual) effects of cameras on jurors, witnesses, counsel,
and judges through questionnaires and interviews with judges, attorneys, and
members of the media.201 The study included no objective comparison of the
behavior and perceptions of jurors in two test groups: those with electronic
media and those without such media.202 Therefore, there was no non-media
group to compare to the experimental group.
Furthermore, the studies did not directly measure the attitudes of jurors, witnesses, or parties “because most have had little courtroom experience and
could not, we believed, make judgments (as judges and attorneys could) about
the effects of electronic media on themselves.”203 Therefore, the studies gauged
the responses of attorneys and judges, but omitted the equally vital opinions of
defendants, witnesses, jurors, and other trial participants. In addition, as frequently acknowledged by social scientists, self-reporting questionnaires are
often highly unreliable. Furthermore, the pilot courts were chosen from courts
where judges volunteered to participate and most of the study’s analyses fo	
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cused on judges who had experience with electronic media coverage.204 Therefore, it is to be expected that those judges would tend to be more favorable toward electronic coverage than would a sample of judges selected at random.205
Although the pilot program’s coverage was limited to civil proceedings, its
findings were so general that the findings arguably extended to criminal proceedings.206

	
  

	
  

D. Findings that Undermine the Positive Benefits of Camera Coverage
The 1994 Federal Judicial Study revealed that stories did a poor job of providing viewers with detail about the legal process.207 This severely undermines
the “educational benefit” justification normally given for allowing such technology in courts. Additionally, plaintiffs and their attorneys received more “air
time” than defendants and their attorneys.208 The lack of balance in covering
the parties of litigation could present a biased, incomplete account of the trial.
Finally, the lack of a control group severely undermined the credibility of the
study’s data. One study that compared the effects of traditional and electronic
media coverage on mock witnesses and jurors found that witnesses who were
subjected to electronic media coverage reported being distracted and “somewhat uncomfortable” about the media presence.209
Other states’ studies contain equally concerning statistics about the negative
impact of cameras on trial participants. For example, a New York pilot program and study found that 33% of witnesses interviewed did not have a favorable view of such coverage.210 In addition, 37% of attorneys reported that the
atmosphere in the courtroom was tense as a result of video coverage, and 38%
of attorneys stated that the testimony of witnesses was affected by coverage.211
Almost half of the attorneys surveyed believed that the audio-visual coverage
negatively affected the fairness of trial.212 Finally, judges and members of the
public expressed strong concerns about the educational benefits, nature of coverage, the effect on witnesses, fair trial implications, and impact on privacy of
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cameras in the courtroom.213
E. Shortcomings of Amended KS and UT Rules
The amended Kansas rules provide a positive step in that they not only clarify what types of technological devices are allowed in courtrooms, but more
significantly, how those devices must be used. Kansas and Utah should be
commended for leading the movement to include emerging technology in their
court rules, which will lead to more uniformity and predictability across courtrooms. However, while offering a step in the right direction, both rules include
shortcomings that should be addressed by future states revising their courtroom
rules.
1. Vagueness over the Applicability of Rules/Ineffective Enforcement Procedure for Rule Violations

	
  

	
  

i. Applicability of Rules
The media coverage rules in Kansas apply in “all cases to a judicial district
or court issuing specific orders, local rules, or guidelines for the use of electronic devices in judicial proceedings.”214 Utah’s rules are equally broad, with
applicability “to the courts of record and not of record” and govern electronic
coverage of “proceedings that are open to the public.”215 The Kansas and Utah
rules could be improved by specifying which stages and types of trials, if any,
are presumptively barred from coverage. The larger problem with the rules is
that both states have equated the right of access with the right to broadcast, an
argument that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Nixon v. Warner Communications.216

	
  

ii. Permitted and Prohibited Uses of Electronic Devices
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216 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978). The Nixon court said:
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report what they have observed.
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Kansas’s rules take the unusual (but highly important step) of not only clarifying what devices are permitted, but also how such devices must be used.217
Although devices are allowed in court, the use of those devices is extremely
limited.218 Considering the extensive restrictions on devices, it is difficult to
understand why courtroom observers are allowed to bring electronic devices
into the Kansas courtrooms in the first place. The burden placed on the participants to the legal proceedings to ensure that the prohibitions are enforced
would likely present a significant challenge—smartphones are discrete devices
with a panoply of functions. Additionally, the Kansas rules specify the prohibited uses of electronic devices, but do not give a clear procedure for their enforcement.219 Court Martials can likely handle blatant violations of the rule during trial proceedings. However, a court observer who subtly takes a picture or
video of the proceeding poses a risk more difficult to discern and enforce.220
iii. Rule Violations and Punishments
The “punishment” for violating Kansas’ rule, that one’s electronic device
“may be confiscated”221 lacks the strong deterrence value that should necessarily accompany such a broad liberalization of the electronic device policy. The
clarity and strong deterrence value of Utah’s punishments render them far superior. The Utah rules state that those who violate electronic media rules or
court orders may be held in contempt of court, sanctioned by law, or removed
from the proceeding, and that the judge may terminate or suspend electronic
media coverage.222 Opening the court to modern technology may greatly improve public access and judicial transparency. At the same time, liberal electronic media policies may be severely abused. To counteract the inherent risks
of electronic media access, punishments must be straightforward, simple to
apply, and stringent enough to deter potential rule violations. Additionally,
judges must have a range of punishments at their disposal to deal with infractions that vary in severity.
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The Kansas rule allows the judge to make an exception for “the news and
educational media and others—such as a publisher, editor, reporter, or other
person . . . who gathers, receives, or processes information for communication
to the public, or an online journal in the regular business of newsgathering and
disseminating news or information to the public . . . .”223 The Kansas rules
specify that electronic communications may only be used for purposes of education or news dissemination.224 Additionally, the ability to photograph, record,
or broadcast live from court is limited to those who obtain prior permission
from the court.225 Court observers are presumably not included in the rule, and
journalists who do obtain the court’s permission are treated as an “exception”
to the general prohibition against using electronic devices in court.226 In
contrast, Utah’s rules broadly define “news reporter” as:
[A]ny person who gathers, records, photographs, reports, or publishes information for the primary purpose of disseminating news and information to
the public, and any newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, press
association or wire service, radio station, television station, satellite broadcast,
cable system, or other organization with whom that person is connected.227
Attorney Jeff Hunt, a member of the Judicial Committee who crafted the
new rule explained, “The language in the rule defining a news reporter is quite
broad, and we drafted it that way intentionally . . . It includes any person who
is gathering information for dissemination to the public. You don’t have to be
connected to or employed by a traditional media outlet.”228
Kansas’ and Utah’s definitions of the “media” are both problematic in
scope. By limiting its definition of “media” to traditional journalists, Kansas’
rules exclude unconventional journalists and other members of the public from
contributing to the marketplace of ideas. In addition, the Supreme Court has
explicitly said that the rights of the media should not exceed those of the general public.229
However, Utah’s broad definition of “media” is problematic. The failure of
Utah’s rule to categorize different types of journalists could pose a problem,
because members of the media may vary tremendously in their methods, work
products, and audiences. Utah’s definition is so expansive that the rule seem	
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quotation marks omitted).
229 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
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ingly extends to citizen bloggers and anyone else with a large online following.
Sifting through the (possible) flood of competing requests to broadcast might
unduly burden the judge. Because many individuals would qualify under the
new rules, it could become difficult for the judge to distinguish between the
“news media” and members of the public. Non-traditional journalists might be
uninterested in providing full and fair coverage of the proceedings. Consequently, the reporting of the trial could be biased, unbalanced, and inaccurate.
All journalists (and members of the public) who wish to broadcast should be
subject to a duty of fair reporting.

	
  

	
  

v. Judicial Autonomy
Even more troubling is that Utah’s rules state that “there is a presumption that electronic media coverage by a news reporter shall be permitted in
public proceedings. The judge may prohibit or restrict electronic media coverage only if the judge finds that the reasons for doing so are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the presumption.”230 Such a broadly stated rule creates a
dangerous precedent that threatens judicial autonomy. It is the job of a judge to
control what occurs in his courtroom, and such authority should necessarily
include the case-by-case discretion of whether to permit coverage.
Rather than discouraging judges from restricting coverage, the Kansas rule
better protects the judge’s right to control his courtroom, and states “the privilege granted by this rule does not limit or restrict the judge’s power, authority,
or responsibility to control the proceedings before the judge.”231 Further, the
judge can remove all electronic devices from the courtroom, including the devices held by those persons with the privilege.232 In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, the Supreme Court stated that “[O]ur cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.”233 Giving “news reporters” presumptive coverage forces the court to accommodate the needs of the media and general public, rather than prioritizing
the rights of the defendant and others who have a legitimate stake in the outcome of the litigation.
Utah’s rule also does not provide sufficient guidance to judges to help them
in deciding whether to prohibit or restrict coverage. The rule requires judges to
consider “some or all” of nine factors when determining whether the presump-
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tion of electronic coverage has been overcome and should be prohibited or restricted. Offering a list of specific factors to aid judges in their decisionmaking is positive step. However, the rule is still ambiguous, in that it does not
state how judges must weigh these factors in their determination of whether or
not to limit or prohibit coverage. A stronger proposal would be to shorten the
list of factors or provide particularized circumstances that trigger a restriction
of coverage.
F. Burden on Courts and Other Logistical Considerations
One of the most compelling arguments against allowing extensive coverage
and expanding the use of technology in courtrooms is the enormous burden
required to coordinate judges, media personnel, and court staff. Both the Kansas and Utah rules specify a variety of detailed protocol and procedures that
must be followed by members of the media reporting from trial. For example,
the Kansas rules state that members of the media must request permission at
least a week in advance, although the judge may “waive this requirement for
good cause.”234 The Utah rules are even less restrictive, and allow a “news reporter” to request written permission as late as one business day before the
proceeding is scheduled. Such a rule places the court at the whim of the media,
who may seek last minute requests to report on the eve of high-profile trials.
High profile trials that capture the public’s attention may be more likely to be
the targets of exaggerated, distorted, and inflammatory reporting. Furthermore,
because modern technology and the boom of Internet sources offers hundreds
of new online platforms, such prejudicial publicity may go largely undetected
by the judge.
Kansas and Utah have different procedures for handling requests from the
media, pool arrangements, and other logistical concerns. In Kansas, the chief
judge must assign a coordinator or other court employee to handle to serve as
an intermediary between judges, media, and others making a request under the
rule. Utah, on the other hand, lessens the costs borne by courts and preserves
judicial efficiency by making it the duty of reporters (rather than the court) to
designate a media representative and to organize pooling arrangements. The
detailed logistical considerations of the Utah and Kansas rules over pooling
arrangements, lighting, equipment, and media coordination are meant to
streamline electronic media coverage, but in practice such coordination may
prove laborious and time-consuming. North Carolina and Virginia both offer a
simple and effective solution: the broadcasting associations in their respective
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states must designate one person to represent each media industry (i.e., television media, radio broadcasters, and photographers). Such representatives are
the only persons authorized to speak for the media to the presiding judge and
are responsible for negotiating with court officials.
But perhaps the biggest risk of the new rules is that journalists may provide
real-time coverage from trial. The instantaneous nature of such broadcasting
creates a danger that a minor’s name, juror’s face, or inaccurate account can be
disseminated to a broad audience and the damage can be impossible to undo.
In Kansas, for example, a judge declared a mistrial after a reporter tweeted a
photo containing the profile of a juror, an express violation of the Kansas media rules.235 Live broadcasting also strips trial participants (such as the defendant) of the opportunity to object to potentially prejudicial parts of trial (such
as being led in to courtroom in restraints) before the coverage is widely broadcast. Parties are left with the unappealing task of proving the negative impact
of coverage on the outcome of the trial after an unfavorable verdict has been
rendered.
In Massachusetts, a pilot program called OpenCourt offers several innovative improvements to help solve some of these logistical challenges.236 One
important improvement is that recorded coverage is delayed, which allows
judges a chance to review the coverage and gives parties a chance to object.237
In addition, judges have a “toggle switch” on the bench, which allows them to
block audio and video coverage for certain parts of trial, such as the testimony
of a particular witness.238

	
  

	
  
	
  

VII. PROPOSED
SOLUTION
A. Need for Uniformity
During the past several decades, technology has changed and evolved at an
unprecedented rate. Whereas the debate over technology in court once revolved around video cameras, the discussion has now shifted to smartphones,
laptops, and social media. The rules governing electronic media vary significantly by state and judge. While the Supreme Court tacitly approved state experimentation with cameras in Chandler, the Court has yet to prescribe the
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specificity needed to guide state and federal courts. A uniform set of rules that
transcends state lines would lead to more just, equitable, and efficient judicial
outcomes.

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

B. Goals of a Uniform Law
A proposed uniform law should have several goals. First, it should clearly
define terms such as “reporter,” “broadcast,” and most importantly, “electronic
media” to prevent confusion and differing interpretations among judges. The
rules should expressly state not only what types of devices are permitted, but
also how these devices must be used. Second, while a proposed uniform law
should be specific enough to eliminate confusion, it must also be flexible
enough to account for the rapid pace at which technology evolves, and be able
to accommodate advances that have not yet occurred. Third, the rule should
offer a balance of discretionary and bright-line policies for judges to guide
their decision-making and preserve their autonomy over their own courtrooms.
One proposal is to emulate the “tiers” of state restrictiveness and provide specific factors tied to levels of presumption (i.e., a presumption in favor of complete media coverage, partial media coverage, or against media coverage). For
example, if the case involves a minor victim, sexual-assault victim, or a defendant with a history of violence, the presumption would be against media coverage. To overcome a presumption against coverage, the burden would be on the
media to prove that electronic media coverage would not compromise the
safety or fairness of proceedings.
C. Logistical Considerations
New electronic media rules should streamline permission forms and procedures to make coordination between court and media personnel as easy as possible. Georgia state courts, for example, have adopted the same form for all
those who wish to request permission to broadcast from trial.239 Other innovative new media policies include those in North Carolina and Virginia, where
one media representative is designated for each industry.240 These policies ensure efficiency, in that judges only communicate and negotiate with a select
few designated and credentialed individuals. Finally, new electronic policies
must contain clear punishments to deter violations of the rule and to preserve
judicial decorum.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
While Utah and Kansas’ amended rules offer a step in the right direction,
they also unfairly skew the right of access in favor of the public and overlook
the equally vital interests of trial participants. New rule policies must overcome this shortcoming by clearly stipulating rules and sanctions, streamlining
forms and procedures, defining statutory terms, specifying which electronic
devices are permitted, mandating how such devices must be used, and clarifying how judges must weigh the competing constitutional rights of trial participants. As new technologies continue to infiltrate the courtroom, legislatures
must take steps to ensure that the safety, security, and decorum of proceedings
are preserved while at the same time respecting the press and public’s interest
in the free flow of information.

